What happened to the artificial-intelligence investment boom?
Many economists believe that generative artificial intelligence (AI) is about to transform the global economy. A paper published last year by Ege Erdil and Tamay Besiroglu of Epoch, a research firm, argues that 「explosive growth」, with gdp zooming upwards, is 「plausible with ai capable of broadly substituting for human labour」. Erik Brynjolfsson of Stanford University has said that he expects ai 「to power a productivity boom in the coming years」.
许多经济学家认为，生成式人工智能（AI）即将改变全球经济。 Epoch 研究公司的Ege Erdil和Tamay Besiroglu去年发表的一篇论文认为，随着GDP飙升，「AI能够广泛替代人力劳动」的「爆炸性增长」是「合理的」。斯坦福大学的Erik Brynjolfsson表示，他预计AI「将在未来几年推动生产力繁荣」。
For such an economic transformation to take place, companies need to spend big on new software, communications, factories and equipment, enabling AI to slot into their production processes. An investment boom was necessary to allow previous technological breakthroughs, such as the tractor or the personal computer, to spread across the economy. From 1992 to 1999 American nonresidential investment jumped by 3% of gdp, for instance, driven in large part by extra spending on computer technologies. Yet so far there is little sign of an ai splurge. Across the world, capital expenditure by businesses (or 「capex」) is remarkably weak.
要发生这样的经济转型，公司需要大举投资新软件、通信、工厂和设备，使AI能够融入他们的生产过程。以前的技术突破，如拖拉机或个人计算机，要在经济中广泛传播，就必须经历投资热潮。例如，从1992年到1999年，美国非住宅投资跃升了GDP的3%，主要是由于额外的计算机技术支出。然而，目前还没有看到AI狂潮的迹象。全球企业的资本支出（或「capex」）非常疲软。
After sluggish growth in the years before the covid-19 pandemic, capex increased as lockdowns lifted (see chart). In early 2022 it was rising at an annualised rate of about 8% a year. A mood of techno-optimism had gripped some businesses, while others sought to firm up supply chains. Capex then slowed later the same year, owing to the effects of geopolitical uncertainty and higher interest rates. On the eve of the release of OpenAI’s GPT-4 in March 2023, global capex spending was growing at an annualised rate of about 3%.
在新冠疫情之前的几年里，capex增长缓慢，随着封锁措施的解除，capex有所增加（见图表）。在2022年初，它的年增长率约为8%。一些企业抱有技术乐观主义，而其他企业则寻求巩固供应链。同年晚些时候，由于 地缘政治 不确定性和更高利率的影响，capex增长放缓。在OpenAI于2023年3月发布GPT-4的前夕，全球capex支出的年化增长率约为3%。
Today some companies are once again ramping up capex, to seize what they see as the enormous opportunity in ai. This year forecasters reckon that Microsoft’s spending (including on research and development) will probably rise by close to 20%. Nvidia’s is set to soar by upwards of 30%. 「AI will be our biggest investment area in 2024, both in engineering and compute resources,」 reported Mark Zuckerberg, Meta’s boss, at the end of last year.
如今，一些公司再次加大capex投入，以抓住他们所看到的AI巨大机遇。今年，预计微软的支出（包括研发）可能会增长近20%。Nvidia的支出预计将增加超过30%。去年年底，Meta的老板马克·扎克伯格报道说：「AI将是我们2024年最大的投资领域，包括工程和计算资源。」
Elsewhere, though, plans are more modest. Exclude firms driving the AI revolution, such as Microsoft and Nvidia, and those in the S&P 500 are planning to lift capex by only around 2.5% in 2024—ie, by an amount in line with inflation. Across the economy as a whole, the situation is even bleaker. An American capex 「tracker」 produced by Goldman Sachs, a bank, offers a picture of businesses’ outlays, as well as hinting at future intentions. It is currently falling by 4%, year on year.
然而，在其他地方，计划则更为谨慎。排除推动AI革命的公司，如微软和Nvidia，标普500指数中的公司计划在2024年仅将capex提高大约2.5%——即与通胀水平相当。在整个经济中，情况甚至更加黯淡。高盛银行制作的一个美国capex「追踪器」提供了企业支出的情况，并暗示了未来的意图。目前它正在以4%的年率下降。
Surely, with all the excitement about generative AI’s potential, spending on information technologies is at least soaring? Not quite. In the third quarter of 2023 American firms’ investment in 「information-processing equipment and software」 fell by 0.4% year on year.
毫无疑问，随着人们对 生成式AI 潜力的兴奋，信息技术的投资至少在飙升吗？并非如此。在2023年第三季度，美国公司在「信息处理设备和软件」上的投资同比下降了0.4%。
Similar trends are observable at a global level. According to national-accounts data for the oecd club of mostly rich countries, which go up to the third quarter of 2023, investment spending—including by governments—is growing more slowly than in the pre-pandemic years. A high-frequency measure of global capex from JPMorgan Chase, another bank, points to minimal growth. With weak capex, it is no surprise that there is little sign of productivity improvements, according to a real-time measure derived from surveys of purchasing managers (see chart).
在全球范围内也可以观察到类似的趋势。根据经合组织（主要是富裕国家的俱乐部）的国民账户数据，截至2023年第三季度，包括政府在内的投资支出增长速度比疫情前的年份慢。摩根大通另一家银行提供的全球capex高频测量指标显示最小增长。在capex疲弱的情况下，据采购经理调查衍生的实时测量显示生产力改进的迹象很少（见图表）。
An official survey in Japan does point to sharply higher capex growth in the future, after years of sluggishness. Yet this probably reflects factors specific to that country, such as reforms to corporate governance. And in most places outside America the situation is rather less encouraging. A worsening outlook for the economy in Europe does not help. Investment intentions of services companies in the European Union are less than half as ambitious as they were in early 2022. British businesses plan to raise capex by a mere 3% over the next year, compared with 10% when asked in early 2022.
日本的官方调查确实指出未来capex增长将显著提高，结束多年的低迷。然而，这可能反映了该国特有的因素，如对公司治理的改革。在美国以外的大多数地方，情况则不那么乐观。欧洲经济前景的恶化并没有帮助。欧盟服务公司的投资意图不到2022年初的一半。与2022年初询问时相比，英国企业计划在未来一年内将capex增加仅3%。
These trends suggest one of two things. The first is that generative AI is a busted flush. Big tech firms love the technology, but are going to struggle to find customers for the products and services that they have spent tens of billions of dollars creating. It would not be the first time in recent history that technologists have overestimated demand for new innovations. Think of cryptocurrencies and the metaverse.
这些趋势表明两种可能性之一。第一种可能性是生成式AI是一个失败的投资。大型科技公司热衷于这项技术，但可能会发现很难找到客户来购买他们花费数百亿美元创建的产品和服务。这并不是近代科技人员第一次高估了对新创新的需求。想想加密货币和元宇宙。
The second interpretation is less gloomy, and more likely. The adoption of new general-purpose technologies tends to take time. Return to the example of the personal computer. Although Microsoft released a groundbreaking operating system in 1995, American firms only ramped up spending on software in the late 1990s. Analysis by Goldman Sachs suggests that while only 5% of chief executives expect AI to have a 「significant impact」 on their business within one to two years, 65% think it will have an impact in the next three to five. AI is still likely to change the economy, but with a whimper not a bang.
第二种解释不那么悲观，也更有可能。新的通用技术的采用往往需要时间。回到个人计算机的例子。尽管微软在1995年发布了突破性的操作系统，美国公司直到1990年代末才加大对软件的投资。高盛的分析表明，虽然只有5%的首席执行官期望AI在一到两年内对其业务产生「重大影响」，但有65%的人认为它将在接下来的三到五年内产生影响。AI仍然有可能改变经济，但这将是一个悄然而非轰动的变化。
